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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

whether the party seeks damages or rescission. Only where the alleged
fraud runs to the arbitration clause itself may the court enjoin arbitration. But where the provision is "less than broad" or where an adhesion
contract is employed, "a court should give the provision and the circumstances surrounding its inclusion in the contract great scrutiny.' 177
CPLR 7503(a): Venue limited to court where action is pending in
application to stay arbitration.
CPLR 7502(a) states that "[a] special proceeding shall be used to
bring before a court the first application arising out of an arbitrable
controversy which is not made by motion in a pending action." It then
sets forth the venue for making such application.
The statute's aim is to provide that it is this first application which
commences the special proceeding 178 and to assure the proper service
and notice safeguards of article 4 proceedings in general, 179 at least
where no action is pending and thus the parties are not yet before the
court. But neither the language of the section, case law, nor commentary make clear whether, where an action is in fact pending, the procedure and accompanying venue outlined in CPLR 7502(a) become
unavailable. Must the application regarding arbitration be made in
the court where the action is pending or are the broader venue provisions of CPLR 7502(a) 8 0 applicable?
If the first application is one to compel arbitration, the problem
is easily resolved, for CPLR 7503(a) mandates that the exclusive forum
for raising such a motion is the one where the action is pending. A comparable limitation, however, does not exist in CPLR 7503(b), which
deals with applications to stay arbitration. The fact that the first application will most probably be a motion to compel has led to occasional confusion and imprecise analysis when dealing with these separate
statutory provisions: the section 7503(a) motion to compel arbitration
on one hand, and the "first application" of section 7502(a) on the
other.' 8 ' If, in fact, the first application arising out of an arbitrable
'77 32 N.Y.2d at 199, 298 N.E.2d at 48, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Such circumstances may
indicate, as in Housekeeper v. Lourie, 39 App. Div. 2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Ist Dep't 1972),
that the arbitration provision was inserted as part of an overall scheme to defraud.
178 The arbitration does not take on the character of a special proceeding until this
application is made. In re Gaffagnio, 48 Misc. 2d 441, 264 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955); In re Beverly Cocktail Lounge, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 376, 256 N.Y.S.2d 812

(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).

179 See 7B M"cKINNEY'S CPLR 7502(a), commentary at 480 (1963); 8 WK&M
7502.02.
180 The venue shall be "...
[the] county specified in the agreement; or if none be
specified, [where] one of the parties resides or is doing business, or, if there is no such

county,... in any county; ....

" CPLR 7502(a). Since this is inconsistent with article 5,

the latter is inapplicable to arbitration proceedings. 7B MCKiNNEY'S CPLR 7502(a), commentary at 480 (1963).
181 See, e.g., the practice commentary accompanying CPLR 7502(a), which in discussing
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controversy is a motion to stay arbitration, and such controversy is the
subject of pending suit, where may the motion be made?
In Application of Allstate Insurance Co.

8

2

the Supreme Court,

Westchester County, dealt with these peculiar facts. A negligence action
had been begun in the Supreme Court, Nassau County. When one of
the insurance companies involved disclaimed liability, a notice of intention to arbitrate, pursuant to CPLR 7503(c), was served on Allstate,
who then commenced a special proceeding in Westchester County via
83
an application to stay arbitration, on the authority of CPLR 7502(a).
Although holding that it lacked jurisdiction over this proceeding
for improper service of the order to show cause,'1 4 the court nevertheless deemed it proper to discuss the issue of venue, which it raised sua
sponte, 18 5 since the jurisdictional defect might easily be cured. The
court conceded that, were no action pending in Nassau County, venue
in Westchester County would be proper under CPLR 7502(a) because
the first sentence of that provision, states that it "deals with an independent application
to compel arbitration . . ." 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 7502(a), commentary at 480 (1963) (emphasis added). Clearly, this is not what the first sentence states. See also 22 CARMODY-WArr
2d, § 141:80, at 838-39 & n.12 (1968), where it is stated that if an application for a stay is
the first application, and if an action is pending, "it shall be made by motion in such
action." The only authority cited in the footnote to this statement, however, is CPLR
7502(a) itself, which, taken alone, is not sufficient authority to warrant such a condusion.
Commentators have made similar assumptions on a similar lack of authority. See, e.g.,
22 SYRAcusE L. REV. 94, 95 (1970). But see 8 WK&M
7502.01 (a pending action does not
preclude commencement of a special proceeding in connection with the arbitration).
182 75 Misc. 2d 795, 348 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973).
183 In its commentary to proposed section 17.2(a), subsequently enacted (with minor
changes) as CPLR 7502(a), the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure states:
. . . the notice of intention to arbitrate in effect commences a judicial proceeding.
A subsequent motion to stay by the party served would actually be the 'first
application' to a court arising out of the controversy....
FOURTH REP. 77.
184 Since article 4 is applicable to arbitration proceedings, commencement must meet
the usual service requirements. Thus if service is improper, it is a jurisdictional defect,
not a mere irregularity. But see Fagenson v. First-York 86th St. Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 1069,
343 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
185 While recognizing the well-settled rule that a court cannot change venue except

by motion of a party, the court asserted that, having "the inherent power of control over
its own calendar. . . ," it could "'fashion a rule whereby its control is reaffirmed, not
thwarted' and thus rationalized its sua sponte raising of the venue issue. 75 Misc. 2d at
800, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 687, citing Chiques v. Sanso, 72 Misc. 2d 376, 380, 339 N.Y.S.2d 394,
400 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972). It is significant, however, that the Chiques case
and those upon which it relies dealt with applications for a general preference. The rules
of the Second Department require that in order to get a general preference, the venue must
have been properly laid in the county wherein the action was pending. 22 NYCRR 74.1(a).
Since the petitioners were seeking relief pursuant to a rule with a built-in condition
precedent, viz., proper venue, the cases are dearly distinguishable from Allstate. See, e.g.,
Rab v. Colon, 37 App. Div. 2d 813, 324 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam); Plachte
v. Bancroft, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 437, 161 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Ist Dep't 1957); Carbide & Carbon
Chem. Co. v. Northwest Exterminating Co., 207 Misc. 548, 139 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1955).
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the petitioner was doing business there.8 6 In this case, however, the
court felt compelled by what it characterized as logic and consistency
to read sections 7502(a) and 7503(a) together, concluding therefrom
that "venue in the first instance must be in the county in which the
action is pending....",s 7
While the language of 7502(a) is by no means conclusive proof as
to its purport, a preferred reading would appear to indicate that, while
a special proceeding is mandatory where no action is pending, it may
also, but need not, be used188 where an action is pending. Committee
reports support this reading:
If the first application is made in a pending action rather than by
a special proceeding, subsequent motions may be made in that action since no special proceeding would be pending. The section
does not, however, preclude the commencing of a subsequent special proceeding in connection with the arbitration. 8 9
Provision for the making of motions in pending actions seems
intended to supplement the venue of CPLR 7502(a), rather than to
limit it.' 90 Certainly there was no cogent reason for the court in Allstate
to have analogized CPLR 7502(a) to CPLR 7503(a) rather than to
CPLR 7503(b), the section of the statute which is more appropriate to
the kind of application made in this case.
While judicial economy and concern for overcrowded calendars' 91
188 75 Misc. 2d at 800, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 687. See In re Manitt Constr. Corp., 50 Misc. 2d
502, 507-08, 270 N.YS.2d 716, 721-22 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966). Compare CPLR 506(a),
which provides the venue for special proceedings generally.
187 75 Misc. at 799, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 87. The court cited CARMODY-WArr 2d as authority.

See note 181 supra. The only stipulation would be that the court where the action is pending have jurisdiction to entertain the action. For further cases on this jurisdictional point
see Edwards v. Bergner, 22 App. Div. 2d 808, 254 N.Y.S.2d 798 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.)
(where an action was pending in a district court, a motion to compel arbitration of a claim
involving more than $6,000 could not be made in that action because of the jurisdictional
limitations on the district court); Columbia Memorial Hosp. v. MacFarland Builders, Inc.,
74 Misc. 2d 870, 344 N.Y.52d 63 (Columbia County Ct. 1973) (if the power to compel
arbitration is limited to a court of competent jurisdiction, so too is the power to stay;
thus a motion to stay involving claims exceeding $6,000 could not be made in county court).
188 See AL-R Constr. Co. v. Gorlin-Okun, Inc., 41 App. Div. 2d 876, 42 N.YS.2d 950
(3d Dep't
1973) (mem.).
189 Frm Rn,. 180; SmTH RE'. 647 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the commentary
does not make clear where this subsequent special proceeding may be commenced. The last
sentence of CPLR 7502(a) reads ".

.

. subsequent applications shall be made by motion

in the pending action or the special proceeding." (emphasis added). If the subsequent
proceeding is deemed a subsequent "application," is a limitation imposed on the venue of
this subsequent motion? An extended grammatical discourse on parallel sentence structure is far afield of the subject at hand, but rules of statutory construction support the
interpretation that, since the word "pending" precedes "action" only in the above-quoted
portion of CPLR 7502(a), where a new special proceeding is commenced, petitioner need
not be bound to any prior forum.
190 See 8 WK&M 7502.10.
101 This was the primary concern voiced by the Allstate court. 75 Misc. 2d at 800; 348
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would indicate a preference for the result reached by the court, it cannot be assumed that it is a result which the Legislature intended. 192
Without lucid legislative commentary to guide us, it should not be
presumed that limiting motions to compel arbitration to the forum
of the pending action, while omitting a parallel provision for applications to stay, was an act of legislative oversight rather than of conscious
intent. The Allstate decision does point up the need for a definitive
interpretation of the scope and limitations of the venue provisions of
CPLR 7502(a), or article 75 in general.
Although the court's sua sponte discussion of venue is technically
dicta,'19 3 its order that "[h]ereinafter the Court shall strike matters such

as the instant one from the calendar and deny the application..."1 94
will undoubtedly affect future controversies of this nature. To require
that an application to stay, which is the first application to the court
relating to an arbitrable controversy, be made in the pending action
is to engraft onto CPLR 7502 and 7503 limitations not placed there
by the Legislature.
INSURANCE LAw

Insurance Law § 59-a: Jurisdiction over foreign insurer may not be
predicated upon the unauthorized acts of its limited agent.
Section 59-a of the Insurance Law was enacted to facilitate suits
against unauthorized foreign insurers whose activities affect New York
residents. 95 It subjects such insurers to jurisdiction when they engage
in certain activities, including the mailing of policies into the state.
While the statute's jurisdictional reach is longer than that of CPLR
302,196 it may not be interpreted so as to confer jurisdiction over a
N.Y.S.2d at 687. Apparently, applications to stay arbitration are brought automatically by
insurance companies under uninsured motorist provisions whether meritorious or not,
adding to calendar congestion.
192 If, as the court asserts, it was the Legislature's aim to limit motions relating to
pending actions to the forum already introduced to the issues, a more efficacious argument might have been found in reliance on CPLR 7502(a) itself, rather than CPLR 7503.
193 See notes 184 and 185 supra.
194 75 Misc. 2d at 800, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (without prejudice- to renewal of the
application in the "proper" county).
195 The statute states in pertinent part:
The legislature declares that it is a subject of concern that many residents of
this state hold policies of insurance issued or delivered in this state by insurers
while not authorized to do business in this state, thus presenting to such residents
the often insuperable obstacle of resorting to distant forums for the purpose of
asserting legal rights under such policies.
N.Y. INs. LAW § 59-a(l) (McKinney 1966).
196 See A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Ist Dep't
1966).

